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THE LAST REFUGE OF OFFICIAL
DISCRIMINATION: THE FEDERAL FUNDING
EXCEPTION TO CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 209
Stephen R. McCutcheon, Jr.* & Travis J. Lindsey**
INTRODUCTION
The California Civil Rights Initiative, better known as
Proposition 209,1 has been the law in California for over seven
years In the arenas of public education, contracting, and
employment, the initiative bans government discrimination
and preferences based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin.3  Immediately following the adoption of
Proposition 209, proponents of state-sponsored discrimination
and preferences challenged the constitutionality of the
Proposition.4 Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 209, the decision
did not end state-sponsored discrimination and preferences.
Instead, the battle over Proposition 209 shifted to
enforcement of the new law, including the interpretation and
* Attorney, Sweeney & Grant LLP. Staff Attorney, Pacific Legal
Foundation, 1997-2003. J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of
Law, 1997.
** Attorney, Pinnell & Kingsley. College of Public Interest Law Fellow,
Pacific Legal Foundation, 2002-2003. J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law 2002; California State Senate Fellow 1998-1999; B.A,, Sonoma
State University, 1998. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the
Pacific Legal Foundation Article Development Seminar and Program for
Judicial Awareness.
1. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (Deering 2002), reprinted in Appendix A.
2. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir.
1997) (explaining that Proposition 209 was passed by the California electorate
in November 1996).
3. In this article, the term "race" refers to "race,... color, ethnicity or
national origin" as those terms are used in Article I, section 31(a) of the
California Constitution.
4. See Coalition, 122 F.3d at 700.
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application of its exceptions.5
This article provides a framework for understanding and
evaluating claims that racial preferences and discrimination
are required by the federal government as a condition of
maintaining or establishing eligibility for receipt of federal
funds and are therefore exempt from the mandate of
Proposition 209 under section 31(e).' As evidenced by recent
litigation, the proper interpretation of this exception will be
the most heated battleground over the initiative's
enforcement.7  Both the proponents of state-sponsored
discrimination and their opponents have much at stake over
the interpretation of this exception. A broad construction of
the federal funding exception will undermine the intent of the
people of California to return California law to the principle
of equal rights for all.
This article argues that California courts should
narrowly construe the federal funding exception to ensure
that the purpose of Proposition 209 is not frustrated. The
plain language of section 31(e), the federal funding exception,
includes two distinct criteria that must be satisfied: (1) any
racial discrimination and/or preferences "must be taken to
establish or maintain eligibility" for a federal program, and
5. Proposition 209 includes three exceptions to the prohibition of state-
sponsored discrimination and preferences on the basis of race and sex. These
exceptions provide for sex-based bona fide occupational qualifications, see CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 31(c), the preservation of existing consent decrees, see id. §
31(d), and race- and sex-conscious actions required as a condition of eligibility
for federal funding, see id. § 31(e).
6. Article I, § 31(e) of the California Constitution shall be referred to as the
"federal funding exception" and "section 31(e)" throughout this article. This
section provides: "Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting
action which must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal
program, where ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the State."
Id. § 31(e).
7. Interpretation of the federal funding exception is currently being
litigated in United Utilities v. Sacramento Municipal Utility District, No.
00AS3306 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed June 20, 2000), appeal docketed, No. C040761
(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2002), and Hillside Drilling, Inc. v. City of Berkeley, No.
C-99-4646 MMC, 2002 WL 413371 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2002), affd, No. 02-
15767, 2003 WL 21462544 (9th Cir. Jun. 24, 2003). In United Utilities, the
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) is appealing a summary
judgment ruling by the Sacramento Superior Court finding SMUD's public
contracting program unconstitutional and outside the scope of the federal
funding exception. In Hillside Drilling, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision by the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
California rejecting Hillside Drilling's challenge to minority participation and
reporting requirements imposed by the City of Berkeley.
PROPOSITION 209
(2) unless the state entity discriminates and grants
preferential treatment, it will become ineligible and lose
federal funds as a consequence.8  Because section 31(e)
provides an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of the
ban on race- and sex-based discrimination, the state entity
must carry the burden of proving that its action actually falls
within the purpose and language of the exception.
Furthermore, because state-sponsored discrimination and
preferences are presumptively unconstitutional, the federally
mandated race and sex preferences must meet a strict
scrutiny analysis. A proper interpretation of the federal
funding exception will allow state and local government
entities to continue receiving federal funding while complying
with federal law, without thwarting the intent of California's
voters.
Section I of the following analysis discusses the adoption
and enforcement of Proposition 209. Section II explains how
exceptions to statutes and constitutional provisions are
narrowly interpreted in California to insure fulfillment of the
law's purpose. Section III examines the proper interpretation
of the elements of the federal funding exception, and Section
IV explains that Proposition 209 does not prevent compliance
with federal funding conditions, illustrating this point with
an examination of several common "affirmative action"
requirements found in federal grant programs and federal
regulations.
I. PROPOSITION 209 REVERSED THE TREND OF STATE-
SPONSORED DISCRIMINATION THAT "AFFIRMATIVE ACTION"
HAD BECOME
Proposition 209 ushered in a new civil rights era in
California as the product of a retro-movement that sought to
reverse the trend of race- and sex-based preferences promoted
8. See CAL. CONST. art I, § 31(e) (reflecting the intent of the voters to not
jeopardize the receipt of federal funds by the state and local governments);
Analysis of Legislative Analyst, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL
ELECTION (1996), http://vote96.ss.ca.govNote96/html/BP/ (Nov. 5, 1996); Official
Title and Summary, (stating that Proposition 209 "[d]oes not prohibit...
actions necessary for receipt of federal funds"). This exception was included by
the drafters of Proposition 209 to foreclose the measure's opponents from
campaigning that "the CCRI would cost California voters $X million in federal
money." Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive
Guide, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1387 (1997).
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by government agencies in the name of equality of
opportunity.9 Before a single vote was cast, opponents of
Proposition 209 asserted that the language of the initiative
was vague and would encourage discrimination against
women.'0  To the contrary, Proposition 209 elevated the
standard of judicial review for sex-based discrimination from
the mere intermediate scrutiny imposed by the Fourteenth
Amendment" to the same standard applied to racial
9. See Pete Wilson et al., Argument in Favor of Proposition 209, in
CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION (1996), supra note 8
(discussing the intent to restate the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Hi
Voltage WireWorks, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1070 (Cal. 2000)
(noting that it is appropriate for the court to consider the official ballot
pamphlet when determining the will of the voters); W. Telecon, Inc., v. Cal.
State Lottery, 917 P.2d 651, 654 (Cal. 1996) (discussing official materials put
before the voters on Proposition 37 to create a state lottery).
10. See Edward W. Lempinen, Furor Over Latest Anti-209 Ad / TV Spots
Feature Cross-burnings, Hooded Klansman, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 1, 1996, at A29
(explaining that opponents claimed that Proposition 209 threatened maternity
benefits, girls' sports programs, and abortion rights).
Professor Neil Gotanda, echoing Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, stated
that the reach of Proposition 209 would not be evident until courts interpreted
it, which was impossible to predict because the text was drafted ambiguously.
Neil Gotanda et al., Legal Implications of Proposition 209 - The California Civil
Rights Initiative, 24 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) (citing Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Impact of the Proposed California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 999, 1004 (1996)). Professor Chemerinsky may have been
attempting to scare female voters when he argued that sex discrimination
would no longer be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard if Proposition
209 was passed. Chemerinsky, supra, at 1014. But see Pamela A. Lewis,
Debunking the Myth that Subdivision (c) of the California Civil Rights
Initiative Lessens the Standard of Judicial Review of Sex Classifications in
California, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1153, 1155 (1996). Lewis argued that
Proposition 209 would not jeopardize protections against sex discriminations:
Opponents of the CCRI [California Civil Rights Initiative] have seized
upon the language in subdivision (c) regarding bona fide sex
qualifications, and have argued that it will impact the judicial level of
scrutiny applied generally to sex classifications. That assertion is
erroneous. Subdivision (c) of the CCRI does not weaken the existing
protections against sex discrimination provided by federal or state
laws and constitutions.
Id.
11. The United States Supreme Court has not held sex to be a suspect
classification under the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus applies a form of
intermediate scrutiny. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996);
see also Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 19 (Ct. App. 2001)
(noting that sex is subjected to only heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but is treated as a suspect class under the California
Constitution).
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discrimination-strict scrutiny. 12
The American Civil Liberties Union and other
proponents of race and sex preferences challenged Proposition
209 immediately after it was passed. 3  "The ink on
Proposition 209 was barely dry"4 when this band of liberal
organizations filed a lawsuit in federal court attacking the
Proposition's constitutionality." Although the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the facial constitutionality of
Proposition 209 in Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson,'"
state and local government agencies as well as special
interests did not give up attempts to undermine the
17
measure.
12. The contention that Proposition 209 permits discrimination against
women was conclusively put to rest by the California Third District Court of
Appeal, which held: "[U]nder our state Constitution, strict scrutiny applies to
gender classifications. In addition, Proposition 209 imposes additional
restrictions against racial and gender preferences and discriminatory actions."
Connerly, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16.
13. On November 6, 1996, the day after the election, the American Civil
Liberties Union, NAACP, and other liberal and race-based special interest
groups filed a complaint in the Northern District of California against several
officials and political subdivisions of the State of California, alleging Proposition
209 denied women and racial minorities equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment and that it was void under the Supremacy Clause
because it conflicted with Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972. See also Jeanne-Marie
Pochert, Note, Proposition 209: Public Policy Considerations in Coalition for
Economic Equity v. Wilson, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 689, 689-90 (1998). See
generally Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir.
1997).
14. Coalition, 122 F.3d at 700.
15. See id. at 698, 700.
16. See id. at 702, 709-10.
17. For example, the California legislature promptly moved to make
"findings" which reinterpreted the meaning of Proposition 209's prohibition of
discrimination to permit race- and sex-based "outreach." See S.B. 1735, 1997-
1998 Sess. (Cal. 1998) (vetoed Sept. 24, 1998). The support for this bill came
overwhelmingly from organizations which define their membership and goals in
terms of race and sex and other liberal special interest groups. See Senate
Floor Analysis on SB. 1735, 1997-1998 Sess. (Cal. Aug. 30, 1998) (showing that
forty of the fifty-three organizations supporting the bill are overtly based on
race or sex), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/97-98/billlsen/sb_1701-
1750/sbj1735_cfa_19980830_185658_senfloor.html. The Governor of
California, in his September 24, 1998 veto message, noted that it is not the role
of the legislature to redefine the meaning of Proposition 209, and that the
legislature's reinterpretation conflicts with its plain language. See Veto
Message on S.B. 1735, 1997-1998 Sess. (Cal. Sept. 24, 1998), available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/sen/sb_1701-
1750/sb_1735_vt_19980924.html. In the 2003-04 legislative session, Assembly
Bill 703 attempts to redefine the common-sense definition of "discrimination"
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The Ninth Circuit's decision upholding Proposition 209
was only the beginning of the fight. 8 As was noted at the
time, "[a]lthough lawyers on both sides said [the] decision
ends the major legal challenges to Proposition 209, there are
likely to be further lawsuits involving its enforcement."'9
Professor Volokh successfully predicted "[t]here will be lots of
litigation on the margins.""° Those at the White House barely
reacted. Referring to the President's "mend it, don't end it"
stance on affirmative action, President Clinton's press
secretary simply stated "I think our views of Prop. 209 are
very well known."21 The Clinton administration filed amicus
curiae briefs in the lower courts arguing that the initiative
was unconstitutional.2
Local government agencies' reactions to the Ninth
Circuit's Coalition decision varied. Some decided to forgo any
changes in their policies absent legal action by Proposition
209 supporters," while others took immediate steps to change
their regulations to comply with the initiative. 4 Several
and "preferences" adopted by the voters with the definitions under the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. These definitions would exempt "special measures" (i.e., the
preferences Proposition 209 was intended to prohibit) from the definition of
"discrimination" and eliminate the right of individual citizens to challenge race-
based preferential treatment. Three of the four special interest organizations
supporting A.B. 703 before the Assembly Judiciary Committee define their
membership based on race. See Race Discrimination: Definitions and Actions,
Hearing on A.B. 703 Before the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, 2003-2004
Sess. (Cal. May 6, 2003) (showing registered support for the legislation),
available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_0701-
0750/ab 703_cfa_20030513_114441_asmcomm.html.
18. Governor Pete Wilson vowed to enforce the ban vigorously, and civil
rights groups began examining ways to blunt its impact. See Note, The
Constitutionality of Proposition 209 as Applied, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2081, 2082
(1998).
19. David G. Savage, High Court Allows Prop. 209s Repeal of Afflirmative
Action Justices: Rejection of Challenge Opens Way to Enforce the Measure in
State, Local Government. Outcome Is Major Victory for Champions of
Colorblind Standard, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997, at Al. But cf Gotanda, supra
note 10, at 6-7 (quoting Professor Chemerinsky). Professors Gotanda and
Chemerinsky mistakenly predicted that government agencies were likely to end
affirmative action programs rather than risk lawsuits.






recalcitrants have suffered adverse judgments, 2 and others
continue to litigate in hopes of thwarting the initiative.26
Hi- Voltage Wire Works v. City of San Josd' was one of
the first Proposition 209 enforcement cases to be decided by
the courts. After the passage of Proposition 209, the City of
San Jose amended its public contracting program,
purportedly to comply with Proposition 209.8 However, the
amendments merely provided a face lift to the city's
traditional racial preference program. For example, the
"Office of Affirmative Action/Contract Compliance" became
the "Office of Equality Assurance," 9 and the participation
goals stating the percentage of work that should be performed
by minority and women subcontractors became an
"evidentiary presumption" of nondiscrimination. ° Hi-Voltage
Wire Works, an electrical contractor, challenged this program
on the grounds that regardless of the city's post-Proposition
209 amendments, the contracting program violated
Proposition 209 by requiring contractors bidding on city
projects to use a specific percentage of minority and women
subcontractors, or to document efforts to recruit minority and
women subcontractors for inclusion in their bids.2 ' Although
both the San Jose Superior Court and the California Court of
Appeal for the Sixth District held that the program violated
Proposition 209, the city challenged the rulings in the
25. The City of San Jose, Sacramento Municipal Utility District,
Huntington Beach Union High School District, California Lottery Commission,
State Personnel Board, State Lottery Commission, and California community
colleges have all suffered adverse decisions attempting to defend their
discriminatory policies from Proposition 209 attacks. See Hi-Voltage Wire
Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068 (Cal. 2000); United Utils. v.
Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., No. 00AS3306 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2002),
appeal docketed, No. C040761 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2002); Crawford v.
Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96 (Ct. App. 2002);
Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 17-18 (Ct. App. 2001).
26. Proposition 209 claims are currently being litigated against the City and
County of San Francisco, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District, and others.
San Francisco in particular has vowed to defy Proposition 209. See supra note
25; Rebecca Smith, Comment, A World Without Color: The California Civil
Rights Initiative and the Future of Affirmative Action, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
235,266 (1997).
27. 12 P.3d 1068 (Cal. 2000).
28. See id. at 1070-71.
29. Id. at 1071.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 1070-72.
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California Supreme Court." The supreme court, in an
opinion that left no room for misunderstanding, confirmed
that Proposition 209 mandates zero tolerance for
discrimination," and struck down the program, giving
Proposition 209 proponents a major victory.34
Proponents of Proposition 209 scored another victory in
Connerly v. State Personnel Board," when the California
Court of Appeal struck down a variety of state statutes for
violating Proposition 209.36 The statutes at issue in Connerly
established race and gender preferences in the California
State Lottery Commission's public contracting,37 in the
selection of underwriters for the sale of government bonds,38
in the hiring under the State's civil service processes,3 9 and in
the hiring and promotion by community colleges.4"
Similarly, in the public education context, a taxpayer
with a child who attended school in the Huntington Beach
Union High School District filed a lawsuit challenging its
student transfer policy.4  White students who attended
predominantly minority campuses could not transfer from
their schools unless another white student transferred in.42
This case presented the issue of whether the policy violated
Proposition 209, regardless of a California statute that
allowed schools to maintain "appropriate racial and ethnic
balance[]." 43 The school district won at the trial court level,
but lost in the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth
District, where the court rejected the school district's
argument that race-based assignments were harmless
because all the schools provided the same educational
32. See id. at 1072.
33. See Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1083
(Cal. 2000) (citing the ballot pamphlet).
34. See id. at 1083-84.
35. 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5 (Ct. App. 2001).
36. See id. at 16.
37. Seeid. at31-32.
38. See id. at 32-36.
39. See id. at 36-39.
40. See id. at 39-42.
41. See Crawford v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 121 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 96 (Ct. App. 2002).
42. See id. at 1278.
43. See id. at 1277-79 (school district relying upon California Education
Code § 35160.5 (Deering 2002)).
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program." The California Supreme Court denied the school
45district's petition for review.
Unable to defeat Proposition 209 claims on their merits,
opponents of Proposition 209 either have turned to the federal
funding exception under subsection (e) of Article I, section 31,
or have argued that the preemption exception under
subsection (h) insulates their racial preferences from
challenge.46  Published opinions have not heretofore
addressed these questions. However, in United Utilities v.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District, the Sacramento
Superior Court addressed the question of whether the federal
funding exception foreclosed the plaintiffs' legal challenge to
the Sacramento Municipal Utility District's contracting
program, which involved race-based preferences."
Interpreting the federal funding exception in accordance with
the plain language, the court held that Sacramento Municipal
Utility District (SMUD) must prove that the race-based
elements of its contracting program are required as a
condition of receiving federal funds, and that SMUD would
lose federal funding in the absence of preferential treatment
to women and minorities." In striking down the
discriminatory portions of the contracting program, the court
found that SMUD failed to demonstrate that its bid discount
program was required as a condition of receiving federal
funds, and therefore, the exception did not apply. Moreover,
the court found that SMUD failed to produce evidence that it
would lose federal funds if it discontinued its program.
SMUD has appealed the decision to the California Court of
44. See id. at 1283, 1286-87; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 374 U.S. 483,
495 (1954) (rejecting arguments that a professed equality of schools excuses
discrimination in school assignments).
45. See Crawford, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105 (noting California Supreme
Court denial of petition for review on August 28, 2002).
46. Subsection (h) of Article I, section 31 provides that should any provision
of section 31 conflict with federal law or the United States Constitution (i.e., be
preempted), that the remainder shall be implemented to the maximum extent
permitted by federal law and the United States Constitution.
47. See Decision on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 1-2, United
Utils. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., No. 00AS3306 (Cal. Super. Ct., decision
filed Jan. 8, 2002).
48. See id. at 3.
49. See id. The court explained that "[o]n the decisive issue [of] whether the
[racial preference program] is required to establish or maintain eligibility for
federal funding.., the court is left with nothing but speculation." Id. at 5.
50. See id. at 3.
2004 465
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
Appeal for the Third District.51
Both sides of the debate over government-sponsored
discrimination have much at stake over the interpretation of
section 31(e). Should the courts construe section 31(e) in
accordance with its plain meaning and the intent of the voters
to eliminate race and gender preferences, government
agencies will have to repeal additional discriminatory
programs that are currently justified by ambiguous federal
mandates for "affirmative action." The ultimate outcome of
United Utilities is unknown,52 as is the final interpretation of
section 31(e).
II. To RESPECT THE WILL OF CALIFORNIA'S VOTERS, THE
EXCEPTIONS TO PROPOSITION 209 MUST BE NARROWLY
CONSTRUED
A. Narrow Construction of Legal Exceptions Is the Norm in
California, and Is Especially Compelling in the Case of
Popular Initiatives Like Proposition 209
Laws commonly contain exceptions which represent the
intent of the legislature or voters.53 Proposition 209 is no
different, and includes several narrow exceptions to its broad
prohibition of race- and sex-based discrimination. Article 1,
section 31(a) states, "[t]he state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting."55 Sections 31(c)-(e) and (h)
of the initiative contain exceptions to part (a), including
exceptions for bona fide occupational qualifications, existing
51. See United Utils. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., No. C040761 (Ct.
App., docketed Mar. 21, 2002).
52. The briefing in the court of appeal was completed in June 2003, and the
parties are awaiting oral arguments.
53. The purpose of judicial interpretation is to determine legislative intent,
or in the case of initiatives, the intent of the voters. See Hi-Voltage Wire
Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1082-83 (Cal. 2000) (considering
the legislative intent based on ballot materials provided to the voters); see also
Volokh, supra note 8, at 1360-87. Without providing exceptions, Proposition
209 would have prohibited single sex bathrooms, dormitories, and sports teams,
id. at 1360, and bone fide occupational qualifications, id. at 1368, or at least
presented conflicts with federal law, id. at 1387-88.
54. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(c)-(e), (h) (Deering 2002).
55. Seeid.§31(a).
466 Vol: 44
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consent decrees, and the federally required preferences that
are the subject of this article."5
In general, exceptions must be strictly construed,57 and
"will not be extended beyond the import of their terms."8
California case law has held that courts should narrowly
construe exceptions such as section 31(e) to insure that the
purpose of the law in question is fulfilled.59 The drafters of
Proposition 209 intended the exceptions to be limited and
narrowly interpreted, with the measure enforced to the fullest
extent permitted by federal law and the United States
Constitution."
In light of section 31(a)'s purpose of restoring civil rights
to the fundamental proposition of equal opportunity for each
individual, it is essential that courts interpret the federal
exception narrowly.6' Proposition 209 was introduced to
56. Section 31(c) exempts bona fide qualifications based on sex; section 31(d)
exempts court orders and consent decrees; section 31(e) exempts actions
necessary to establish or maintain eligibility for federal funding; and section
31(h) exempts actions from section 31(a) when section 31(a) would be preempted
by federal law or the Constitution. See id § 31(c)-(e), (h).
57. See Edward H. Gaylord, An Approach to Statutory Construction, 5 Sw.
U. L. REV. 349, 372 (1973) (citing Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Continental Nat'l
Bank, 98 Cal. App. 523, 533 (1929)).
58. 58 Cal. Jur., Statutes § 116 (3d ed. 1980).
59. See San Jose Teachers Ass'n v. Barozzi, 281 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (Ct.
App. 1991) (citing Telefilm, Inc. v. Superior Court, 201 P.2d 811, 816 (Cal.
1949)) ("[O]ne who relies on the exception must establish it within the words as
well as the reason."); see also Gold v. Superior Court, 475 P.2d 193, 199 (Cal.
1970) ("To fulfill this legislative purpose the statutory exception must be
narrowly construed and carefully restricted."); National City v. Fritz, 204 P.2d
7, 8-9 (Cal. 1949) (construing an exception narrowly to further the intent of the
statute); Hurst v. City & County of San Francisco, 201 P.2d 805, 807 (Cal. 1949)
(construing exception to city charter provision narrowly as charter served to
limit county power).
60. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(h) (providing that section 31(a) "shall be
implemented to the maximum extent that federal law and the United States
Constitution permit"); see also Volokh, supra note 8, at 1386, 1388 (noting that
section 31(h) provides that section 31(a) "shall be implemented to the maximum
extent that federal law and the United States Constitution permit"). Professor
Volokh was a legal advisor to the drafters of Proposition 209. However, "[his]
Article is not a campaign document. It [was]... published after the election
and.., played no role in the campaign debates." Id. at 1336 n.2.
61. See Pete Wilson et al., Argument in Favor of Proposition 209, in
CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION (1996), supra note 8
(arguing that "special interest[] hijacked the civil rights movement. Instead of
equality, governments imposed quotas, preferences, and set asides"); see also
Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 27 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Hi-
Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1083 (Cal. 2000))
(noting that "[in adopting Proposition 209, the voters 'intended to reinstitute
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replace the divisive use of race- and sex-based preferences
with race neutrality.62 There can be no "dispute [that] the
clear intent of the voters was to outlaw preferential
programs" that give advantages on the basis of race and sex.63
The principle of narrowly construing exceptions in view
of voter intent has recently been applied by the California
courts in closely analogous circumstances. In Schweisinger v.
Jones," the California Court of Appeal had to interpret the
scope of an exception to Proposition 140, an initiative which
established legislative term limits. The court looked to the
plain language of the statute in light the intended goals of
voters in adopting Proposition 140,6 noting "the People,
through a reform measure designed to severely limit
incumbency, prohibited service of more than three terms,
subject to a single defined exception. The exception should
not be read broadly and other exceptions are precluded by the
doctrine, expressio unius est exclusio alterius."6 The court
further concluded that "[a broad interpretation of the
exception] would create a loophole which would frustrate the
intention of the People."67
the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act and equal protection that predated
[the decisions in Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)... and other
cases],' by prohibiting the state from classifying individuals by race or gender").
62. See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION (1996), supra
note 8. But see Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race,
Ethnicity, and the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1135, 1135-37 (1996). Professor Gotanda writes:
A persistent theme in the campaign for the California Civil Rights
Initiative has been its claim of moral superiority. CCRI advocates
argue that the CCRI embodies racial neutrality. They call for a color-
blind America, and they invoke the name of Martin Luther King. The
proponents of the CCRI loudly proclaim that it is they who seek racial
justice, and it is the defenders of affirmative action who are
reinforcing racial discrimination. Race color blindness has been
presented as a progressive, forward-looking "vision" of racial justice. I
believe that this is a total distortion of race color blindness.
Id.
63. Kidd v. State, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758, 770 (Ct. App. 1998).
64. 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183 (Ct. App. 1998).
65. See id. at 186.
66. Id. at 186-87 (first emphasis added).
67. Id. at 187.
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B. The General Rule ofNarrow Interpretation of Exceptions
Applies to Proposition 209 as a Measure to Reform State
Constitutional La w
The narrow construction principle described in
Schweisinger applies equally to the federal funding exception
under section 31(e). Courts must construe this exception in
light of the purpose of section 31(a), and not in a manner that
frustrates the intention of the people. As a whole, section 31
was adopted to reform the status of discrimination law in
California" and like the original Civil Rights Act of 1964, is
intended "to achieve equality of [public employment,
education, and contracting] opportunities" and to remove
"barriers [that] operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification."" To
ignore the purpose of achieving equality and allow
government agencies to interpret the federal funding
exception broadly would be to repeat the sad history of courts
thwarting the purpose and intent of civil rights legislation."°
The imperative of narrowly construing exceptions is
especially compelling for measures like Proposition 209,
enacted through the initiative process to reform the state
government when the legislature has failed or refused to do
so." The courts have described the initiative and referendum
as articulating "one of the most precious rights of our
democratic process," and have sought to "jealously guard" and
effectuate the initiative process." In Beaumont Investors v.
Beaumont-Cherry Valley Water District,"3 the government
68. See supra note 61.
69. Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1083
(Cal. 2000) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.424, 429, 431 (1971)).
70. See id. at 1072-74 (discussing how civil rights legislation was turned
from its core purpose of equality of treatment into race-based decision making
with a goal of racial balancing).
71. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (Deering 2002) ("All political power is
inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security,
and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good
may require."); see also DeVita v. County of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1026-27 (Cal.
2002) (noting the right of the people to turn to the initiative process to be
guarded jealously).
72. Associated Home Builders of the Greater E. Bay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1972) (quoting Mervynne v. Acker, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 340, 344 (Ct. App. 1961)); see, e.g., infra notes 73-76 and accompanying
text.
73. 211 Cal. Rptr. 567 (Ct. App. 1985).
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attempted to skirt Proposition 13's restriction on local
agencies' power to impose taxes by characterizing a
prohibited special tax, used to fund the construction of future
water facilities, as a "service fee" exempt from Proposition
11 4 The court of appeal reasoned that it had the duty to
protect Proposition 13's purpose of restricting local
authorities' power, and prevent a "perversion" of the voters'
intent.15  The Beaumont court therefore required the
government to carry the burden of establishing that it fit the
exception to Proposition 13.6
The exceptions to Proposition 209, like the exception to
Proposition 13 in Beaumont, should be narrowly construed in
a manner consistent with its language. More importantly,
the exceptions to Proposition 209 should be construed to
protect the will of the voters against the creation or
exploitation of loopholes." Given the number of special
interest groups with a vested interest in undermining
Proposition 209, there can be no doubt that the initiative
needs to be protected from the onslaught of attacks by special
71interest groups. Interpreting the federal exception narrowly
will not only follow well-established case law, but also further
ensure the elimination of discrimination and preferences, as
the people intended.
III. SECTION 31(e) PROVIDES A NARROW EXCEPTION TO THE
PROHIBITION OF STATE-SPONSORED DISCRIMINATION
A. The Federal Funding Exception Requires State-
Sponsored Discrimination to Meet Two Criteria
The plain language of section 31(e) exempts state-
sponsored discrimination from section 31(a)'s prohibition only
when it is required as a condition of establishing or
74. Seeid. at 571.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068 (Cal.
2000) (discussing the ballot pamphlet and the intent of the voters to
countermand the government's imposition of quotas, preferences, and set-
asides).
78. See Senate Floor Analysis on S.B. 1735, 1997-1998 Sess. (Cal. Aug. 30,
1998) (showing that forty of the fifty-three organizations supporting the bill are




maintaining eligibility for federal programs that will provide
funding to the state, and the state will lose funds if it becomes
ineligible."9 On its face, section 31(e) provides: "Nothing in
this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action which
must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any
federal program, where ineligibility would result in a loss of
federal funds to the State." °
To fall within the plain language of this exception, the
state-sponsored discrimination and/or preferences must meet
two criteria. First, section 31(e) requires the state entity to
prove that its race-based classification is an "action which
must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for a federal
program."'" Second, the state entity must prove that
ineligibility for the federal program "would result in a loss of
federal funds to the State.
2
1. Subsection 31(e) Exempts Only Those Actions
Required as a Condition of Eligibility for Federal
Funding-Consistency with Federal Law Is Not
Enough
The first element under the federal funding exception
provides that the discriminatory government action must be
required for the entity to establish or maintain eligibility for a
federal program."' If the federal government merely
79. The fundamental purpose of judicial interpretation of statutes is to
determine the intent of the legislature or, in the case of initiatives, the voters.
If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction.
"The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as
to conform to the spirit of the act." Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 304
(Cal. 1988). "A constitutional amendment should be construed in accordance
with the natural and ordinary meaning of its words." Hi- Voltage Wire Works,
12 P.3d at 1082.
80. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e) (Deering 2002).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. Professor Jung has stated, "Generally speaking .. , federal law
does not require states to engage in affirmative action in public education,
employment or contracting. In public employment and public education, federal
law prohibits discrimination and permits, but does not require affirmative
action." David J. Jung, Proposition 209, Preferences and Federal Financial
Assistance, PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH INSTITUTE REPORTS (University of
California, Hastings College of the Law, 1996-1997), at
http://www.uchastings.edu/plri/96-97rp.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
Unfortunately, Professor Jung does not indicate what he means by "affirmative
action." As the Ninth Circuit noted in Coalition, "the term 'affirmative action' is
an amorphous value-laden term, rarely defined so as to form a common base for
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encourages or permits the agency to take race-conscious
actions, the first element has not been met.
84
The discriminatory conduct thus must be necessary for
eligibility-it is not enough that the conduct be potentially
helpful or generally consistent with the spirit of the federal
program. If it is possible to be eligible without the
discrimination, then the discrimination is prohibited, because
it is not true that the action "must be taken" for eligibility.
8 5
Government entities defending Proposition 209 claims
have protested such a strict construction of the first element
of the exception.86 This protest relies on the arguments that
federal grant conditions regarding affirmative action efforts
87
are often vague, lack specific mandates, and most important
for the purposes of this article, do not specifically require
discrimination or preferences based on race and sex.88
Consequently, the state likely cannot produce evidence that
its race- or sex-based preference program is required as a
condition of receiving a federal grant. Instead the state is
relegated to arguing, for example, that the generic obligations
imposed under Title VI requiring non-discrimination and
remedying of identified discrimination actually require race-
and sex-based preference programs. Therefore, preferential
intelligent discourse." Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 700
(9th Cir. 1997) (citing Lungren v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 694 (Ct.
App. 1996)). Thus, "affirmative action" likely includes programs that
Proposition 209 bans as well as programs that it allows. See id.
84. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e); see also Official Yitle and Summary,
CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION (1996) (explaining that
Proposition 209 "[d]oes not prohibit ... actions necessary for receipt of federal
funds"), at http://vote96.ss.ca.govNote96/html/BP/ (Nov. 5, 1996), Analysis of
Legislative Analyst (explaining that Proposition 209 provides an exception to
"keep the state or local governments eligible to receive money from the federal
government).
85. Volokh, supra note 8, at 1387. But see Hillside Drilling, Inc. v. City of
Berkeley, No. C-99-4646 MMC, 2002 WL 413371, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12,
2002) (holding that the City of Berkeley was entitled to rely on the exception set
forth in Art. I, § 31(e) in the absence of any evidence that the city violated the
federal regulations governing eligibility for federal highway funds, as opposed to
requiring the city to submit evidence that the city's specific program was
required by the federal regulations).
86. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 13-17, United Utils.
v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., No. 00AS3306 (Cal. Super. Ct. complaint filed
June 20, 2000).
87. See discussion infra Part IV.
88. See CAL CONST. art. I, § 31(e).
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treatment is "necessary" to maintain or establish eligibility
for federal funding."
To no avail, SMUD fervently made such arguments to the
trial court in United Utilities v. Sacramento Municipal Utility
District.9 ° SMUD receives federal funds from several federal
programs which require it to comply with Title VI and all
associated regulations.9' SMUD argued that regulations
adopted by the Department of Energy, Department of
Defense, and Department of Transportation require its
racially preferential contracting program, the Equal Business
Opportunity Program (EBOP), as a condition of eligibility for
funding.92  All three agencies, however, merely require
recipients to comply with Title VI, and their regulations state
that recipients must take "remedial action" or "affirmative
action" to remedy past discrimination.93 The utility district
failed to identify any law or regulation that actually required
it to discriminate in favor of minorities and women and
instead was left with speculation and supposition that the
amorphous requirements for "remedial action" and
"affirmative action" translate into a mandate for preferences
based on race and sex.94
The language of the first element of the federal funding
exception clearly dictates that the federal government must
specifically require the state government agency to operate a
specific discriminatory program to become eligible for or
maintain eligibility for a federal program. For example, if the
Federal Department of Transportation had ordered SMUD to
implement its bid discount program for minorities and women
89. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text; see also Hi-Voltage Wire
Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 898 (1999) (rejecting the
argument of the City of San Jose that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
required the city to "respond proactively" to a disparity study through the use of
racial preferences), afld, 12 P.3d 1068 (Cal. 2000).
90. United Utilities v. Sacramento Municipal Utility District, No. 00AS3306
(Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 20, 2000), appeal docketed, No. C040761 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 21, 2002). See generally Defendants' Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, United
Utils., No. 00AS03306.
91. See id. at 2.
92. See id. at 15.
93. See id.
94. See Decision on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 3, United
Utils. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., No. 00AS3306 (Cal. Super. Ct. decision
filed Jan. 8, 2002).
2004 473
474 SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW Vol: 44
as a condition of establishing or maintaining eligibility for
Department grants, SMUD might have been able to meet the
first element. The trial court found, however, that "SMUD
offer[ed] no evidence of any express contractual conditions
that make the approval of federal funds for a project
contingent upon the EBOP."95 The strict language of the first
element of the federal exception leaves no room for
discretionary racial preference programs such as that of
SMUD.
2. The State Must Prove that It Will Suffer an
Actual Loss of Federal Funds if It Refuses to
Grant Preferential Treatment on the Basis of
Race or Sex
The second element of section 31(e) states that the
government agency must be required to take discriminatory
action to establish or maintain eligibility, and failure to do so
must result in ineligibility and consequently a loss of federal
funds.96 Hypotheticals97 or conjectures about what federal
agencies might do9 are insufficient to meet the requirements
of the federal funding exception's plain language." To satisfy
this test, the state must make a clear and definite showing
that the federal government will withdraw its funds if the
95. See id.; see also id. at 2 (describing how SMUD's 1998 EBOP used race-
conscious "participation goals" and in some instances "evaluation credits," both
of which violated Article I, section 31(a)).
96. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e) (Deering 2002).
97. See Robinson v. Bd. of Ret., 294 P.2d 724, 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)
(observing that "[a] bare possibility is not evidence...").
98. See Van Pelt v. Carte, 26 Cal. Rptr. 182, 185 (Ct. App. 1962) (noting
that "Conjecture, surmise, and guesswork may not give rise to an affirmative
finding of fact"); see also Oldenburg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 314 P.2d 33, 36
(Ct. App. 1957) (holding that judgment cannot be based on guesses or
conjectures, and verdicts may not be upheld by speculation).
99. See Van Pelt, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 185; Oldenburg, 314 P.2d at 36; see also
Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 28 n.5 (Ct. App. 2001)
("Proposition 209 yields where federal law requires the state to engage in
particular action, but not where it would merely permit such action."); Volokh,
supra note 8, at 1387. Professor Volokh explains the standards by writing:
The discriminatory conduct thus must be genuinely necessary for
eligibility-it not enough that it be potentially helpful, or generally
consistent with the spirit of the federal program. If it's possible to be
eligible without the discrimination, then the discrimination is




state fails to establish or maintain its discriminatory
program. Obviously, if the funding can be enjoyed without
resorting to a race-based program, section 31(e) does not
apply because the race-based program is not an action that
"must be taken" to establish or maintain eligibility for federal
funding.)°
Even if a federal agency threatens to deny or discontinue
eligibility for federal funding, state and local governments
must exhaust available administrative processes to determine
whether they can obtain eligibility for federal funding without
the use of state-sponsored discrimination, and if not, obtain a
final agency determination of the specific actions required for
compliance with federal "affirmative action" grant
conditions."' Absent a final agency determination that
eligibility for funding cannot be had without race-based
action, such actions cannot be said to be "required."
Moreover, failure to obtain a final agency determination of
the actual requirements would supplant the federal agency's
role in interpreting its own regulations and administering its
own administrative processes.)°
In United Utilities, SMUD did not convince the court
that it risked losing federal funding if it did not maintain its
EBOP program.)° SMUD failed to offer any evidence from
federal agencies indicating that the failure to use the EBOP
program would result in the loss of federal funds."' SMUD's
100. See supra note 99.
101. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (the
government may not condition receipt of benefits on compliance with an
unconstitutional condition). Cf CAL. CONST. art III, § 3.5 (Deering 2002)
(requiring an appellate court determination that the enforcement is prohibited
by federal law or federal regulations before state administrative agencies can
refuse to enforce a statute); Stone v. City & County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d
850, 861, 864 (9th Cir. 1992) (requiring a finding that alternatives are
inadequate before overriding state laws).
102. Under the Administrative Procedures Act, pending judicial review of an
agency's decision, the agency or the federal courts may postpone or stay the
order denying eligibility for funding, or set it aside, ensuring that federal
funding continues uninterrupted. 5 U.S.C. §§ 705, 706(2) (2002). But, until the
available administrative remedies-and even judicial remedies, if appropriate-
are exhausted, there is no showing that the federal funding exception under
section 31(e) is satisfied.
103. See Decision on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 3, United
Utils. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., No. 00AS3306 (Cal. Super. Ct., decision
filed Jan. 8, 2002).
104. See id. at 3.
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entire argument rested upon speculation that the federal
agencies might terminate its eligibility for funding-even
though no regulation or law required SMUD to maintain
race- and sex-based preferences in its contracting program.
105
The strongest evidence SMUD could muster was a letter from
the Department of Energy reiterating that Title VI empowers
the Department to terminate funding to entities that refuse
to cease discriminating. 1°6 The court noted, however, that the
Department of Energy has neither found SMUD guilty of
discrimination and required SMUD to adopt a race-based
preference program, nor stated that SMUD would be in
danger of losing its grant without the EBOP program.
Rightfully, the court refused to find that SMUD satisfied the
heavy burden imposed by section 31(e) through its
speculation about what federal agencies might do.' °7
Advocates of preferences may attempt to argue that their
discriminatory program is "necessary" because the federal
government has approved the program. But this argument
ignores the distinction between what the federal government
requires and what it permits, and the notion that states can
meet the "affirmative action" grant conditions without
discriminating. For example, federal magnet school grants
given to public schools to aid their voluntary desegregation
efforts o8 require the school districts to establish desegregation
programs that promote diversity and multiculturalism.' 9 The
grant condition, however, does not dictate the specifics of the
school's program or mandate race-based school
assignments."0
105. See id. at 3-5.
106. See id. at 5.
107. See id. The court reasoned that SMUD did not meet the burden when it
noted:
Were the court to adopt the position advocated by SMUD,
governmental agencies in California would be able to use subsection (e)
to foreclose the mandate of subsection (a) based upon their own
interpretation of what a federal agency might decide or do ...
furthermore it would require the courts to make guesses about whether
federal agencies would agree that race-based programs are required
and whether they would withdraw funding without them.
Id.
108. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 §§ 5301-531, 20 U.S.C. §§ 7231-
7231j (2002).
109. See id. § 7231d.
110. See id. § 7231d, f.
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Desert Sands Unified School District (Desert Sands) and
Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) both receive
magnet school grants.11' Although they serve the same
purpose, their desegregation programs differ dramatically.
LAUSD assigns students to schools based on their race by
denying enrollment to students if the racial imbalance will
increase at a school that is predominantly non-white."'
Desert Sands allows all students to apply for magnet schools
and selects students from a random lottery process that is not
weighted based on race or sex. Without discriminating, this
lottery has resulted in more diverse schools in the district. ' 13
The federal Department of Education has approved both
schools' programs, thus indicating that although the
departmentmay approve race-based desegregation plans, it
does not require LAUSD to discriminate in school
assignments in order to receive a grant.
B. The State Bears the Burden of Proving It Satisfies the
Federal Funding Exception
A court cannot decide a lawsuit without applying the
basic concept of burden of proof.' In a Proposition 209 case,
the plaintiff bears the initial and ultimate burden of proving
the unconstitutionality of the government action under
section 31(a)."' Then, the government bears the burden of
proof on an affirmative defense that its actions are exempt
under the federal funding exception. 6 Both public policy and
111. See LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, OFFICE OF STUDENT
INTEGRATION SERVICES, OFFICIAL MAGNET/ PERMITS WITH TRANSPORTATION
APPLICATION (2001) (copy on file with author).
112. See id. at 4.
113. See id.
114. See J. P. McBaine, Burden of Proof Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV.
242, 242 (1944).
115. The plaintiff "bears the initial and ultimate burden of establishing
unconstitutionality." Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 28 (Ct.
App. 2001) (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986)).
This initial burden can be met by showing that a government scheme employs
race or gender classifications.
116. See San Jose Teachers Ass'n v. Barozzi, 281 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (Ct.
App. 1991) (citing Telefilm, Inc. v. Superior Court, 201 P.2d 811, 816 (Cal.
1949)) (holding that "one who relies on the exception must establish it within
the words as well as the reason"); see also Morris v. Williams 433 P.2d 697, 715
(Cal. 1967) (defendant ordinarily bears the burden of proving any affirmative
defense). The term "burden of proof" has commonly been used to describe both
the burden to persuade the trier of fact that a fact is true, and the burden to
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pragmatism strongly support the assignment of this burden
to the government.117 First, as previously noted, there is
strong public interest in maintaining the vitality of laws
enacted through the initiative process."8 Second, because the
government uniquely possesses evidence of the federal
programs in which it participates and the conditions placed
upon that participation, the government is in the best
position to establish whether section 31(e) applies."9
According to the California Evidence Code, a party
ordinarily has the burden of proof'2' of each asserted fact, "the
existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for
relief or defense."'' Traditionally, burdens of proof were
assigned to the party to whose case the fact was essential, '22
or to the party who was required to establish the "affirmative
position."'23  The party with the burden of proof maintains
produce satisfactory evidence on a particular fact in issue. See James Fleming
Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 51 (1961); see also 2 JOHN WILLIAM
STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (4th ed. 1992); 9 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2486-2487 (James H.
Chadbourn rev. 1981); Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Proing Discrinination
After Price Waterhouse and Wards Cove: Semantics as Substance, 39 AM. U. L.
REV. 615, 620 (1990); Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric:
Shiffing the Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 246 (1988);
Marshall S. Sprung, Taking Sides: The Burden of Proof Switch in Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (1996).
117. Professor O'Neal Smalls argues that allocating the burden of proof in a
civil case should be a policy judgment, which he suggests is the modern
approach. See O'Neil Smalls, The Burden of Proof in Title VII Cases, 25 HOW.
L.J. 247, 247 (1982). He further states that the judgment should reflect a
consideration of inter alia fairness and convenience. See id.; see also R.S.
Radford, Statistical Error and Legal Error: Type One and Type Two Errors and
the Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 850, 870-81 (1988) (arguing that burdens of
proof reflect social and judicial policy regarding allocating the risk of erroneous
judgments in close cases).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 53-70.
119. See, e.g., Beaumont Investors v. Beaumont-Cherry Valley Water Dist.,
211 Cal. Rptr. 567, 571 (Ct. App. 1985) (placing the burden of proof on the
government ensures creation of an adequate record and furthers the voters'
intent by forcing the government to prove it is complying with the law).
120. Burden of proof is also known as the "burden of persuasion," which
means the burden of making the trier of fact believe the facts asserted by a
party. See People v. Valverde, 54 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530 (Ct. App. 1966); see also
Witkin, Cal. Evid. § 1, at 155; § 3, at 157.
121. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (Deering 2002).
122. See Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof The Economics of Legal
Burdens, BYU L. REV. 1, 1 (1997); see also 2 STRONG, supra note 116, § 337; 9
WIGMORE, supra note 116, § 2486.
123. See Lee, supra note 122; see also 2 STRONG, supra note 116, § 337; 9
WIGMORE, supra note 116, § 2486.
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that burden throughout the trial.'24
In United Utilities, the trial court, in ruling on the cross
motions for summary judgment, held that the defendant had
the burden of proving that its program fits under the section
31(e) exception. 2' Citing Beaumont Investors v. Beaumont-
Cherry Valley Water District,26 the court reiterated the
importance of "jealously guarding and effectuating" the
initiative process, 12' and required SMUD to produce evidence
to support its affirmative defense under section 31(e).' 8 The
Beaumont court emphasized that if a plaintiff carried the
burden of proof, it would create an incentive for the
government to avoid creating a record as a litigation tactic.'
2 9
In almost all challenges arising under Proposition 209,
the defending government agency will be the only party
possessing sufficient information to prove-or disprove-the
applicability of the federal funding exception. At a minimum,
the government will have at its disposal any contracts
entered into with federal agencies as well as all
communications regarding any federal grant conditions with
which it is required to comply.
124. See W. S. Montgomery v. Bd. of Admin. of the City Employees' Ret. Sys.,
93 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Ct. App. 1939); Scott v. Wood, 81 Cal. 398, 402 (1889).
125. Decision on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 3, United Utils. v.
Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., No. 00AS3306 (Cal. Super. Ct., decision filed Jan.
8, 2002). The federal district court's opinion in Hillside Drilling, Inc. v. City of
Berkeley, No. C-99-4646 MMC, 2002 WL 413371 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2002),
provides an example of the misallocation of this burden and profound
misunderstanding of section 31(e). In Hillside Drilling the court held that
Berkeley was entitled to rely on section 31(e) unless the plaintiff proved that
Berkeley violated federal regulations. Id. at *5. In so doing, the court not only
imposed the burden of proof on the plaintiff, but effectively provided Berkeley
with the presumption that it was entitled to rely upon section 31(e) that the
plaintiff must prove otherwise.
126. 211 Cal. Rptr. 567 (Ct. App. 1985).
127. See Decision on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 3, United
Utils. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., No. 00AS3306 (Cal. Super. Ct., decision
filed Jan. 8, 2002)
128. See id.
129. See Beaumont Investors, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 571; see also 2 STRONG,
supra note 116, § 337; Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U.
CHI. L. REV. 556, 579 (1973). Professor Epstein suggests that each issue and its
burden should be allocated for reasons of efficiency to the party with superior
access to the evidence necessary to resolve it as a matter of fact. If the evidence
is in the party's favor he has every incentive to make it known. If it is not, his
silence will seal his defeat. See id.
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IV. IN MOST CASES THE STATE CAN COMPLY WITH FEDERAL
GRANT REQUIREMENTS WHILE MEETING PROPOSITION 209'S
MANDATE OF RACE- AND SEX-NEUTRALITY
As demonstrated by Coalition for Economic Equity v.
Wilson,3 ' Hi- Voltage Wire Works v. City of San Jose,"' and
more recently United Utilities v. Sacramento Municipal
Utility District,"' federal law and the greater protections
against discrimination under Proposition 209 are not
mutually exclusive. 3  This portion of the analysis will
examine several well-known federal laws and grant programs
that under limited circumstances require "affirmative action,"
and will explain how the state can comply with these federal
requirements while still complying with Proposition 209.
130. 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), vacating, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal.
1996). Although speaking to the related issue of preemption, the Ninth Circuit
in Coalition explained that nothing in Title VII conflicts with the provisions of
Proposition 209. See id. at 709-10. The district court in Coalition found no
conflict between Proposition 209 and Titles VI and IX, and those Titles do not,
on their face, state an intention to preserve voluntary "affirmative action."
Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1517 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
While finding that Proposition 209 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII, the district court noted that "[b]ecause
Proposition 209 allows required actions under Titles VI and IX no conflict could
transpire between actions required by the statutes and Proposition 209." Id. at
1518 (emphasis added).
131. See 12 P.3d 1068, 1088 (Cal. 2000) (highlighting that Title VII permits,
but has not been interpreted to require, race- and sex-conscious programs).
132. See Decision on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, United Utils.,
No. 00AS3306.
133. The Ninth Circuit in Coalition reiterated the state's "sovereign right to
adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those
conferred by the Federal Constitution." Coalition, 122 F.3d at 709 (citing
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 n.18 (1980)). Moreover,
both Titles VII and IX provide for supremacy of state law, except when state law
requires actions prohibited by federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2003) (Title
VII expressly provides for supremacy of state antidiscrimination laws, except
for "any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which
would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter."); id. §
2000e-2(j) ("Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any [entity] ... subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any
individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin of such individual or group .. "); id. § 2000h-4 (Title IX preserves state
laws "unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act,
or any provision thereof."); see also Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479
U.S. 272, 281-82 (1987) (noting that Congress "simply left [state
antidiscrimination laws] where they were before the enactment of title VII").
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A. Title VI Imposes No Impediments to Enforcement of
Proposition 209
Probably the most common federal grant condition is a
general requirement that recipients comply with Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 Title VI provides: "No person
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.'
35
The express language of Title VI appears to prohibit not
only exclusion from participation, denial of benefits, and
discrimination under federal programs, but also preferential
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (2003). The statute is very thorough in its
description of governmental and quasi-governmental entities that are covered
by Title VI. Section 2000d-4a provides:
For the purposes of this title, the term "program or activity" and the
term "program" mean all of the operations of-
(1) (A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or (B) the entity of
such State or local government that distributes such assistance and
each such department or agency (and each other State or local
government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of
assistance to a State or local government;
(2) (A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a
public system of higher education; or (B) a local educational agency (as
defined in section 7801 of Title 20 [Section 9101 of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965]), system of vocational education, or
other school system;
(4) any other entity which is established by two or more of the entities
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3);
any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.
Id. Any order terminating eligibility for funding must be limited to the
particular program under which the government entity is receiving federal
funds, as 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 provides:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section
may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to
continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as
to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after
opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement,
but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular
political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a
finding has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the
particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has
been so found....
Id. § 2000d-1 (emphasis added).
135. Id. § 2000d.
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treatment based on race. As Title VI reaches no further than
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, '36
and the standards under Title VI are identical to those under
the Fourteenth Amendment,'37 Title VI cannot be construed to
require the racial preferences that the Fourteenth
Amendment barely permits.' 8
In fact, in Alexander v. Sandoval,3 ' the United States
Supreme Court noted that, like the Equal Protection Clause,
Title VI prohibits only intentional discrimination-not the
mere statistical disparity identified in the disparity studies
often used to justify state-sponsored racial discrimination and
preferences. The Alexander court explained:
it is... beyond dispute-and no party disagrees-that §
601 [Title VII prohibits only intentional
discrimination .... Essential to the Court's holding [in
Bakke] reversing that aspect of the California court's
decision was the determination that § 601 "proscribes only
those racial classifications that would violate the Equal
Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.". . . What we
said in Alexander v. Choate, is true today: "Title VI itself




Furthermore, Title VI was not intended to deny eligibility
for federal funding for anything other than a violation of the
constitutional obligation of nondiscrimination. In Bakke,
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed
that "Inlowhere [in the legislative record] is there any
suggestion that Title VI was intended to terminate federal
funding for any reason other than consideration of race or
national origin by the recipient institution in a manner
136. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 n.ll
(11th Cir. 1993).
137. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287; id. at 328
(opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
138. The Ninth Circuit in Coalition wrote: "That the Constitution permits the
rare race-based or gender-based preference hardly implies that the state cannot
ban them altogether." Coalition, 122 F.3d at 708. The court further
emphasized that "the Fourteenth Amendment... does not require what it
barely permits." Id. at 709; see Elston, 997 F.2d at 1406 n.11 ("Since Title VI
itself provides no more protection than the equal protection clause-both
provisions bar only intentional discrimination-we will not engage in a separate
discussion of the Title VI statutory claims, as such an inquiry would duplicate
exactly our equal protection analysis.").
139. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
140. Id. at 280-81 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Applying the plain language and intent of Title VI, if a
state gives preferential treatment in the form of bid discounts
to construction companies owned by Hispanics, all other
construction companies are arguably excluded, denied
benefits, and/or discriminated against by this action. An
exception to this interpretation arises when the racially
preferential program is required to correct past
discrimination such as the "pervasive, systematic, and
obstinate discriminatory conduct" in United States v.
Paradise,2 and is narrowly tailored to remedying the past
discrimination.' Based on this interpretation of Title VI,
most California state agencies should not have a problem
simultaneously complying with Title VI and Proposition 209.
Recipients must simply not exclude, deny benefits, or subject
anyone to race-based discrimination, which is precisely the
discrimination Proposition 209 prohibits. Compliance with
Proposition 209, by definition, guarantees that Title VI is
satisfied.
B. Regulations Implementing Title VIDo Not Require
Violation of the Constitutional Duty of Nondiscrimination
Under Proposition 209
Several federal agencies that grant billions of dollars
each year have adopted regulations implementing the
mandate of Title VI.14 Some federal agencies have
141. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 332.
142. 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987).
143. See id. at 165. The program at issue in Paradise involved a requirement
that one black be promoted for each white promoted in the Alabama State
Police on an interim basis. Id. at 153. The district court ordered this eleven
years after the State Police had failed to develop adequate promotion
procedures to eradicate the effects of prior intentional discrimination against
blacks. Id. At the time of the original lawsuit there had never been a black
State Trooper on the force. Id. at 154. The Supreme Court held that "[t]he race-
conscious relief imposed was amply justified and narrowly tailored." Id. at 185;
see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1988) ("In the
extreme case, some form of narrowly tailored racial preference might be
necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion ... [and the local
government can take action] penalizing the discriminator and providing
appropriate relief to the victim of discrimination.").
144. Several federal agencies have adopted regulations to comply with Title
VI, including the Department of Energy, see 10 C.F.R. Part 1040 (2002); the
Federal Highway Administration, Department of Transportation, see 23 C.F.R.
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interpreted Title VI broadly to require funding recipients to
do more than engage in nondiscrimination, but to take
affirmative steps to eradicate the effects of past
discrimination, or to overcome "under-representation" by
minorities in the program in question.1 4 ' Even if the mandate
of Title VI is interpreted to require such remedial measures,
it does not follow that those remedial measures must include
race- or sex-based preferences as opposed to race- and sex-
neutral remedies that protect the rights of each individual.
146
In addition, Title VI does not require state and local
governments to implement race- and sex-based preferences in
response to an alleged statistical disparity. 147  Statistical
Part 200 (2002); the Department of Justice, see 28 C.F.R. Part 42 (2002); the
Office of the Secretary, Department of Education, see 34 C.F.R. Part 100 (2002);
the Environmental Protection Agency, see 40 C.F.R. Part 7 (2002); and the
Department of Justice, see 45 C.F.R. Part 80 (2002).
145. See Jung, supra note 83. These expansive implementations of Title VI
are constitutionally questionable. No single opinion of the United States
Supreme Court has found that Title VI regulations could proscribe otherwise
lawful activities because of a claimed disparate impact. In Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001), the majority noted that any such finding
is inconsistent with prior Supreme Court opinions. Though no opinion of the
Supreme Court has held that Title VI regulations could proscribe otherwise
lawful activities, five Justices in Guardians Association v. Civil Service
Commision, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), voiced that view of the law at least as
alternative grounds for their decisions, see id. at 591-92 (opinion of White, J.);
id. at 623, n.15 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 643-45 (Stevens, J., joined by
Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). Dictum in Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287 (1985), is similar to the views expressed in Guardians. See id. at 293,
294 n.11, 295. These statements are in considerable tension with the rule of
Bakke and Guardians that § 601 of Title VI forbids only intentional
discrimination, see, e.g., Guardians, 463 U.S. at 612-13 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment), but petitioners have not challenged the regulations
here.
146. It is fundamental that agency regulations cannot be interpreted
independently of the statute under which they are promulgated, e.g., Hunsaker
v. Contra Costa County, 149 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1998), which raises the
question of whether regulations interpreting Title VI may go beyond the plain
language of its mandate of nondiscrimination. As Justice O'Connor noted in her
concurring opinion in Guardians- "[I]t is difficult to fathom how the court could
uphold administrative regulations that would proscribe conduct by the recipient
having only discriminatory effect. Such regulations do not simply 'further' the
purpose of Title VI; they go well beyond that purpose." 463 U.S. at 613.
147. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. This type of backwards
logic was characterized as "doublethink" by the late Justice Mosk in Price v.
Civil Service Commission, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 286-87 (1980) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Justice Mosk stated: [T]he majority purport to eliminate discrimination by
means of creating discrimination; they construe equality of all persons
regardless of race to mean preference for persons of some races over others; and
a hiring program which compels compliance by a reluctant [government agency]
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disparities may raise an "inference" of discrimination, 14
giving a state or local government a reason to examine its
policies and practices for actual discrimination. But, a
disparity study, without more, does not constitute proof of
intentional discrimination by the state or local government,
14 9
and does not create an obligation to provide race- and sex-
based preferences. Title VI, like the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits only intentional
discrimination, not mere alleged statistical disparity.5 '
Although state and local governments may enact race- and
sex-neutral "affirmative action," and take steps to remedy
discrimination by penalizing those guilty of discrimination
and making victims whole, the language of Proposition 209
requires the use of neutral means, unless the Equal
Protection Clause strictly requires race- or sex-conscious
action."' Thus before the state or local government entity is
relieved of its constitutional duty of neutrality under section
31(a), the race- or sex-conscious action must truly be required
under the Equal Protection Clause, and must be necessary to
maintain or establish eligibility for the grant.
1. The Department of Energy Requires State and
Local Entities to Promise Nondiscrimination and
to Eliminate Discriminatory Policies and
Practices
Title 10, section 1040.1 of the Code of Federal
Regulations provides that "no person shall, on the ground of
race, color, national origin,.., be subjected to
is described as voluntary." Id. Justice Mosk further stated:
It is now clear that undergirding much of the rhetoric supporting racial
quotas, and preferential treatment in general, is a view of justice that
demands not that the state treat its citizens without reference to their
race, but that it rearrange and index them precisely on the basis of
their race. The objective is not equal treatment but equal
representation.
Id. at 290-91.
148. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
149. See Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1088
(Cal. 2000).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
151. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 524-25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (permitting race-
conscious measures only to the extent necessary to disestablish a discriminatory
system, and noting that such "power extends no further than the scope of the
continuing constitutional violation").
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discrimination... in connection with any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance from the Department of
Energy."15 No Department of Energy regulation mandates
that state or local government entities must adopt race- or
sex-based quotas, recruitment requirements, or bid
preferences as a condition of eligibility for funding by the
Department of Energy. The regulations do provide that
recipients of funds may engage in voluntary affirmative
action to "encourage participation by all persons regardless of
race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, or age," but
encouraging participation is far from requiring race- or sex-
based affirmative action. 53
Consistent with Title VI's goal of eliminating
discrimination, the Department of Energy's regulations
require funding recipients to evaluate their policies and
practices to ensure that they do not discriminate.' If their
policies and practices discriminate, they must change them,55
and "take appropriate remedial steps"'56 to remedy the effects
of these discriminatory policies and practices.
On its face, this duty to "take appropriate steps" neither
expressly mandates racial preferences, whether in the form of
goals, timetables, or plus factors, nor requires any action that
would be prohibited under section 31(a) of Proposition 209."5'
Indeed, Department of Energy regulations do not require
funding recipients to take any particular type of remedial
action unless specifically ordered by the Department of
Energy's Director of the Office of Equal Opportunity.'58
The Department of Energy provides an administrative
process for challenging any such order and for determining
whether race- or sex-based remedial action is required as a
condition of eligibility for funding."9  Unless and until the
152. 10 C.F.R. § 1040.1(a) (2002).
153. Id. § 1040.7(b).
154. Seeid. § 1040.7(c)(1).
155. See id. § 1040.7(c)(2).
156. Id. § 1040.7(c)(3).
157. Cf Lungren v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 694 (Ct. App. 1996)
(quoting Dawn v. State Pers. Bd., 154 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190 (Ct. App. 1979))
("[Tihe term 'affirmative action'.., is rarely defined.., so as to form a common
base for intelligent discourse."). The Lungren court also explained that most
definitions of the term "affirmative action" (i.e., appropriate steps) would
include race- and sex-conscious actions, as well as neutral outreach. See id.
158. See 10 C.F.R. § 1040.7(a).
159. See 42 U.S.C § 2000d-1; see also 10 C.F.R. § 1040.111-124 (providing the
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provided processes are exhausted, there is no showing that
the Department of Energy requires any actions that would be
prohibited by section 31(a) of Proposition 209, or that the
recipient's race- or sex-conscious actions are immunized by
section 31(e). Under the existing administrative process, the
Department cannot terminate funding unless the Department
(1) holds hearings to determine whether the recipient is
discriminating and (2) makes express findings that the
recipient is discriminating, and (3) the recipient refuses to
stop discriminating in the face of these findings.16 ° Assuming
all of the steps in this process occur, the Director of the
Department of Energy is required to report to the House and
Senate the circumstances and the grounds for denying or
terminating funding before eligibility for funding can be
denied or terminated. 16'
2. The Department of Defense Conditions
Eligibility for Funding on the Recipient's
Promise ofNondiscrimination
Mirroring Title VI's prohibition of intentional
discrimination on which they are based, the Department of
Defense's regulations provide that no person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance from any
component of the Department of Defense. '62
This language does not require funding recipients to
provide racial preferences as a part of their program.
Moreover, nothing in the regulations requires that any
remedial action be race-based rather than race-neutral. The
operative language provides: "In administering a program
regarding which the recipient has previously discriminated
against persons on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, the recipient must take affirmative action to overcome
administrative process for determining compliance and noncompliance with
nondiscrimination requirements, including notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
160. See supra note 159.
161. See 42 U.S.C § 2000d-1; see also 10 C.F.R. 1040.114.
162. 32 C.F.R. § 195.1 (2002).
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the effects of prior discrimination."'63 The phrase "affirmative
action" is not synonymous with "racial preferences." 16 4 Chief
JusticeGeorge, in his concurrence and dissent in Hi-Voltage,
strongly disagreed with the proposition that only race-
conscious efforts can constitute "affirmative action."165 The
Chief Justice expressly noted that "proactive efforts need not
necessarily involve race-conscious or gender-conscious
measures."'66 The regulations neither dictate that any such
affirmative action must be race-based, nor indicate that it
would be insufficient to eliminate the allegedly
discriminatory policies, terminate any employees or program
participants engaging in discrimination, and make the actual
victims of discrimination whole. The Department of Defense
regulations also provide an administrative process for
determining the actions required as a condition of eligibility
for funding, and make clear that eligibility for funding cannot
be denied or revoked without (1) a hearing, (2) express
findings of discrimination, (3) approval by the Secretary of
Defense, and (4) notice to the House and Senate.'67
3. The Department of Transportation Requires
Most Funding Recipients to Promise
Nondiscrimination, but Imposes Additional
Requirements on Federal Highway, Transit, and
Airport Construction Projects
To fulfill its obligation to implement Title VI,' the
Department of Transportation prohibits recipients of funds
from discriminating on the basis of race. Title 49, section
21.1 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance from the Department of
Transportation."'69
163. Id. § 195.4(b)(4)(i).
164. See supra notes 83, 157.
165. See Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1104
(Cal. 2000).
166. Id.
167. See 32 C.F.R. § 195.9(c).
168. See 49 C.F.R. § 21.1 (2002).
169. Id.; see also id. § 21.5(a) (repeating this prohibition of discrimination).
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The Department of Transportation also requires
recipients of funds to take "affirmative action" to remedy
their own discrimination. The applicant or recipient must
take affirmative action to remove or overcome the effects of
the prior discriminatory practice or usage. Even in the
absence of prior discriminatory practice or usage, a recipient
in administering a program or activity to which this part
applies, is expected to take affirmative action to assure that
no person is excluded from participation in or denied the
benefits of the program or activity on the grounds of race,
color, or national origin."o
The mere inclusion of an amorphous call for "affirmative
action" or for remedial efforts to eradicate the effects of past
discrimination does not mandate race-based action, and does
not sufficiently demonstrate that such action is required as a
condition of establishing or maintaining eligibility for funding
from the Department of Transportation. Similar to other
federal executive agencies, the Department of
Transportation's regulations provide for an extensive
administrative process for determining whether race-based
action is necessary,' 71 including administrative hearings7. and
the right to appeal any decision to terminate or deny
eligibility for funding to the Secretary of Transportation.
17
In addition to the general nondiscrimination
requirements of Title VI, the Federal Department of
Transportation's Disadvantaged Business Enterprise
program (DBE program)17 imposes requirements on
participants in particular federal highway, transit, and
airport construction programs. One of the objectives of the
program is to "ensure nondiscrimination in the award and
administration of Department of Transportation-assisted
contracts in the Department's highway, transit, and airport
financial assistance programs."7 ' The program dictates that
recipients may not discriminate:
(a) You must never exclude any person from participation
170. Id. § 21.5(b)(7).
171. See id. § 21.13.
172. See id. § 21.15.
173. Seeid. § 21.17.
174. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 206-09 (1995).
175. See 49 C.F.R. § 26.3 (2002).
176. Id. § 26.1(a).
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in, deny any person the benefits of, or otherwise
discriminate against anyone in connection with the award
and performance of any contract covered by this part on
the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin.
(b) In administering your DBE program, you must not,
directly or through contractual or other arrangements, use
criteria or methods of administration that have the effect
of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of
the objectives of the program with respect to individuals of
a particular race, color, sex, or national origin.'77
The program specifically requires grant recipients to set
an overall goal for DBE participation, particularly in
Department of Transportation-assisted contracts, unless they
will be using $250,000 or less of federal funds.'78 The overall
goal must be based on demonstrable evidence of the
availability of willing and able DBEs relative to all businesses
willing and able to participate in the Department of
Transportation-assisted contract. 179 At first glance, the DBE
program appears to not require preferences. 8 °  The
regulations do, however, provide that set-asides may be used
when no other method could reasonably be expected to correct
egregious instances of discrimination.' The regulations
require recipients to first attempt to meet their goals with
race-neutral means, and only if the attempt fails then to
resort to race-conscious alternatives.' 2
Federal grant recipients can simultaneously comply with
the DBE program and Proposition 209 as long as race-neutral
efforts sufficiently meet the goals of their program. If
recipients are unable to achieve DBE participation through
such efforts, they may be forced to grant preferences.' The
177. Id. § 26.7.
178. See id. § 26.45(a)(1)-(2).
179. See id. § 26.45(b).
180. The regulations state, "You are not permitted to use quotas for DBEs on
DOT-assisted contracts." Id. § 26.43(a). This remains constitutionally
problematic as "[a] participation goal differs from a quota or set-aside only in
degree; whatever label, it remains 'a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic
status."' Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1084
(Cal. 2000) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289
(1978)).
181. See49 C.F.R. § 26.43(b) (2002).
182. See id. § 26.51(a), (d).
183. This forced grant of preferences, however, begs the question of whether
program goals themselves are well-founded or are set artificially high to ensure
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language of the regulations on this point is quite clear: "you
must establish contract goals to meet any portion of your
overall goal you do not project being able to meet using race-
neutral means."'184 The United States Supreme Court has
indicated that affirmative action requirements such as these
may be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.'85 Until the Court issues a clear
decision or finds the DBE program unconstitutional,
Department of Transportation grant recipients probably have
no choice but to grant preferences if race-neutral means of
achieving participation goals are unsuccessful, and face the
potentiality of lawsuits alleging that the grant recipient is
denying contractors the right to compete on equal footing,
regardless of their race.
4. Cops on the Beat- The Attorney General's Law
Enforcement Block Grants
Under 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd, state and local police agencies
may apply for, and the United States Attorney General may
award, grants to "increase police presence, to expand and
improve cooperative efforts between law enforcement
agencies and members of the community to address crime and
disorder problems, and otherwise to enhance public safety.' 86
Grant applications must include "assurances that the
applicant will, to the extent practicable, seek, recruit, and
hire members of racial and ethnic minority groups and
women in order to increase their ranks within the sworn
positions in the law enforcement agency."1 7
Without violating Proposition 209, grant applicants can
promote the recruitment and hiring of minorities with broad,
race- and sex-neutral outreach. The language of the statute
does not suggest that recipients must pursue race- or sex-
conscious means of ensuring that qualified minorities and
women must be singled out for special notice of
opportunities. 8 ' There are many race- and sex-neutral
avenues that law enforcement agencies can pursue such as
that race-neutral means fail and that race-conscious efforts will be required.
184. See id. § 26.51(d) (emphasis added).
185. See supra notes 141-42, 145 and accompanying text.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd(a) (2002).
187. Id. § 3796dd-1(c)(11).
188. See id.
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advertising in publications that cater to women or particular
ethnic groups, sending recruiters to schools that have
significant minority populations,'89 and insuring that the
recruitment and hiring processes do not discriminate in any
way.
5. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968
The general purpose of this grant program is "to reduce
crime and delinquency in the United States.""19 Recipients,
which include state and local police agencies, correctional
agencies, criminal court systems, probation and parole
agencies, and similar agencies,"' are required to "formulate,
implement and maintain an equal employment opportunity
program [(EEOP)].""' Only recipients that have fifty or more
employees, receive grants or subgrants of $25,000 or more,
and have a service population of at least 3% minorities are
required to formulate an EEOP.19'
The EEOPs must have a statement of specific steps the
recipient will take for the achievement of full and equal
opportunity.' Recipients also must describe their program
for recruiting minorities.' 5  Furthermore, recipients are
expected to evaluate their EEOPs continually.'96 Recipients
who need to make improvements are "encouraged" to develop
guidelines under their program which will correct disparities
in a timely manner."'
While still meeting the requirements of the regulations,
state and local agencies that receive grants under the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act can comply with
Proposition 209 by adopting programs to achieve equal
opportunity and recruiting minorities using race-neutral
means."' Furthermore, recipients are not forced, but merely
189. Grant recipients could pursue both of these measures as long as they
also advertise in general publications and recruite at a wide variety of schools.
190. 28 C.F.R. § 42.301 (2002).
191. See id. § 42.302(b).
192. Id.
193. See id. § 42.302(d).
194. See id. § 42.304(g)(1).
195. See id. § 42.304(g)(2).
196. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.306(a) (2002).
197. See id.
198. The race-neutral means discussed in regard to the "Cops on the Beat
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encouraged to develop guidelines to correct disparities in a
timely fashion. 9 9 The regulations do not require that such
guidelines include preferences.2"'
V. CONCLUSION
How courts interpret the federal funding exception is
extremely important to the vitality of Proposition 209. A
broad interpretation of this exception will undermine the
intent of California's voters to remove the State from the
business of granting preferential treatment to some
individuals and groups simply because of their race or sex.
To safeguard the will of the voters and give effect to the
initiative process, courts must interpret the federal funding
exception narrowly, in accordance with both its plain
language and the voters' intent to prohibit state-sponsored
discrimination.
Should a state or local government seek to use
presumptively unconstitutional racial preferences, the
government entity must meet its burden of proving the
affirmative defense under section 31(e). This includes
exhaustion of race- and sex-neutral means to meet federal
affirmative action conditions. And, if the federal granting
agency threatens to discontinue funding the government
entity for the lack of racial preferences, the entity must
obtain a final agency determination that eligibility for
funding will be terminated unless the recipient discriminates
in favor of certain groups on the basis of race or sex. Even if
the state government obtains such a determination, the
defense under section 31(e) may fail. The racial preferences
may be challenged as illegal under the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution, and may be
challenged as excdeeding the federal agency's delegated
powers. Only clear and specific evidence that the recipient
will lose federal funding unless it grants racial preferences is
sufficient to satisfy section 31(e) so as to exempt its racial
preferences from the prohibition under section 31(a).
This common-sense and plain-language construction of
Program," supra text accompanying notes 186-88, are also applicable to the
"Safe Streets Act of 1968."
199. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.306(a).
200. See id.
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section 31(e) does not sound the death knell for affirmative
action because state and local governments have a variety of
race- and sex-neutral tools at their disposal. Moreover, this
interpretation does not require the violation of federal laws or
regulations. Federal grant recipients can meet both federal
grant conditions requiring nondiscrimination and Proposition
209's prohibition of state-sponsored discrimination. If this
proposition is untrue, and state and local government cannot
satisfy federal laws prohibiting discrimination by requiring
that all individuals and groups shall be treated equally, "the
central tenet of the Equal Protection Clause teeters on the
brink of incoherence. '0 1
201. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997).
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APPENDIX A: INITIATIVE TEXT
(a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.
(b) This section shall apply only to action taken after the
section's effective date.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as
prohibiting bona fide qualifications based on sex which are
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as
invalidating any court order or consent decree which is in
force as of the effective date of this section.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as
prohibiting action which must be taken to establish or
maintain eligibility for any federal program, where
ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the state.
(f) For the purposes of this section, "state" shall include,
but not necessarily be limited to, the state itself, any city,
county, city and county, public university system, including
the University of California, community college district,
school district, special district, or any other political
subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within the
state.
(g) The remedies available for violations of this section
shall be the same, regardless of the injured party's race, sex,
color, ethnicity, or national origin, as are otherwise available
for violations of then-existing California antidiscrimination
law.
(h) This section shall be self-executing. If any part or
parts of this section are found to be in conflict with federal
law or the United States Constitution, the section shall be
implemented to the maximum extent that federal law and the
United States Constitution permit. Any provision held invalid
shall be severable from the remaining portions of this section.
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